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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper will describe a voyage of discoverythe
discovery of algorithmic probability. But before I describe
that voyagea few words about motivation.
Motivation in science is roughly of two kinds: In one, the
motivation is discovery itselfthe joy of ‘‘going where
no one has gone before’’the excitement of creating new
universes and exploring them. Another kind of motivation is
the achievement of a previously defined larger goal, and
there may be many subsidiary discoveries on the path to this
goal.
In my own case both kinds of motivation were very strong.
I first experienced the pure joy of mathematical discovery
when I was very younglearning algebra. I did not really
see why one of the axioms was ‘‘obvious,’’ so I tried reversing
it and exploring the resultant system. For a few hours I was
in this wonderful never-never land that I myself had created!
The joy of exploring it only lasted until it became clear that
my new axiom would not work, but the motivation of the
joy of discovery continued for the rest of my life.
The motivation for the discovery of algorithmic probability
was somewhat different. It was the result of ‘‘goal motivated
discovery’’like the discovery of the double helix in biology,
but with fewer people involved and relatively little political
skulduggery.
The goal I set grew out of my early interest in science and
mathematics. I found that while the discoveries of the past
were interesting to me, I was even more interested in how
people discovered things. Was there a general technique
to solve all mathematical problems? Was there a general
method by which scientists could discover all scientific
truths? The problems seemed closely related to induction
and so around 1942 I first defined a general induction
problem. It had two aspects:
The first I called MTM (Mathematical Thinking Machine).
The problem is to do induction when the model generating
the data is known to be deterministic (nonprobabilistic).
The second I called NMTM (Non-MTM). The problem
is to do induction when the model may be probabilistic.
At the time, I felt that the second problem was more
difficult, that it was what scientists did when they invented
theories to account for data. For both problems, I wanted
real, practically realizable solutions, although as ‘‘study
problems’’ I considered cases in which computation might
be impractical.1
I was well aware that the problems were very difficult,
and I expected to spend the rest of my life working on them.
As is normal under such circumstances, the definitions of
the problems changed as I moved toward solutions.
When embarking on a very difficult task, it is well to
prepare for it by collecting tools that are likely to be useful.
In this case the tools were kinds of knowledge. Some tools
that seemed relevant:
1. A good knowledge of science and how scientists make
discoveries.
2. A good understanding of mathematics and how to
apply it to all kinds of problems.
3. Understanding of probability and statistics.
4. A general knowledge of human activitieshow people
solve problems, how they think they solve problems, how
they make predictions.
Of the four items, knowledge of science and math has
been most useful. Studying probability revealed important
deficiencies in our understanding of it. I found surprisingly
little in conventional statistics to be relevant to my goals.
Understanding humans is certainly important when living
in a community of them, but applying this understanding to
my goals has become relevant only after I had discovered
algorithmic probability. At this point the politics and
rhetoric of science become dominant factors influencing the
reception and perception of my discovery by the scientific
community.
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My university education began in 1946. I chose the
University of Chicago because it had very good mathe-
matics and physics departments. It was also very good in the
humanitiesa part of my education that I had hitherto
neglected. I decided to major in physics because it was the
most general of the sciences, and through it I could learn to
apply mathematics to problems of all kinds.
In addition to physics and math, I studied the logical
basis of probability with Carnap, and mathematical biology
with Rapoport and Rashevsky. I left the University in 1951
with an MS in physics, and I began half-time work in
industry as a mathematician-physicist. The rest of my time
was spent on induction research.
The next section gives some important influences on my
thought up to the time I left the University.
2. THROUGH THE UNIVERSITY
2.1. Bridgman
My earliest contact with modern scientific philosophy
may have been P. W. Bridgman’s concept of ‘‘operational
definition’’ [Bri 27]. An operational definition of anything
is a precise sequence of physical operations that enable one
to either construct it or identify it with certainty. When one
cannot make an operational definition of something, this is
usually an indication of poor understanding of it. Attempts
to operationalize definitions can be guides to discovery.
I have found this idea to be an invaluable tool in telling me
whether or not I really understand something.
Although individual concepts in a theory need not be
operational, the theory as a whole must have operational
meaning. Rapoport [Rap 53] discusses the application of
operational concepts in daily life as well as in science.
2.2 Korzybski
Alfred Korzybski has been variously described as char-
latan, dilettante, and genius. He summarized what he felt
were the most important general principles in the history
and philosophy of science and tried to apply those principles
to everyday life as well as to scientific investigation. I found
his major work, ‘‘Science and Sanity’’ [Kor 58] unreadable,
but I got several important heuristic principles from authors
that interpreted andor popularized his work [Rap 53;
Joh 46; Hay 41].
A few principles:
(a) The map is not the same as the territory it purpor-
tedly describes. My interpretation of this idea has expanded
over the years. Korzybski’s emphasis was on features of
the territory that the map did not have. Here, we mean
‘‘territories’’ and ‘‘maps’’ in a very general senseanything
in the real world and something that is supposed to describe
the thing in the real world. Since then I have learned to
appreciate the importance of the rich heuristic associations
of mapsfeatures that the territories do not necessarily
have, but nevertheless make it much easier for us to
understand (and often misunderstand!) the territories.
(b) Two-valued logic is usually inappropriate for
dealing with events in the real world. Part of this takes the
form of a gray scale for both data and predictions. Zadeh’s
‘‘Fuzzy Sets’’ [Zad 65] may be regarded as one way to
develop this idea. Probability theory is another.
(c) When working on a difficult problem, usually people
break it down into subproblems and try to work the sub-
problemsbut often the set of subproblems is not solvable
andor is not really equivalent to the main problem. Either
try to break the problem down in a different way or solve
the main problem directly. This last would be the ‘‘holistic
approach.’’
(d) Often people do not realize that the ill-defined or
apparently unsolvable problem they are working on is really
a subproblem and that (c) is relevant.
2.3. Freud-Poincare
From Freud I got the idea of the unconscious mind: that
there were things going on in one’s brain that one did not
have direct access to. Poincare , made it clear that much of
his serious problem solving occurred in his subconscious,
and I felt this was very common in problem solving of all
kinds in the sciences and the arts.
This view was one important reason for my later rejection
of ‘‘expert systems’’ as a significant step toward artificial
intelligence. Expert systems were (at best) expressions of
peoples’ conscious thought, which was, I felt, a very small
fraction of human problem solving activity.
Other implications: Memory is what you invent to explain
the things that you find in your head. Over the years, the
‘‘facts’’ in this paper will be gradually revised as I reread my
research notes.
Explanations that people give for their own behavior are
not to be taken too seriouslyincluding discussions in this
paper.
2.4. Bayes, Probability, and Human Learning
Probability theory would seem to offer an immediate
solution to the NMTM problem. This turned out to be false.
Probability theory tells how to derive new probability
distributions from old probability distributions. It tells us
how to make decisions from known or derived probability
distributions and known utility functions. It does not tell
how to get a probability distribution from data in the real
worldwhich is what I wanted.
There is a definition of probability in terms of frequency
that is sometimes usable. It tells us that a good estimate of
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the probability of an event is the frequency with which it has
occurred in the past. This simple definition is fine in many
situations, but breaks down when we need it most; i.e., its
precision decreases markedly as the number of events in the
past (the ‘‘sample size’’) decreases. For sample sizes of 1 or
2 or none, the method is essentially useless.
Another common difficulty: It gives no suggestion as to
how to deal with the ‘‘data fusion’’ problem. Suppose left-
handed men have a probability (in the frequency sense) of
0.01 of dying at age 60. Black-haired men have a probability
of 0.001 of dying at age 60. What is the probability of a
left-handed black-haired man dying at age 60?
If, as is often the case in such situations, we have not
collected data on black-haired, left-handed menor if we
only have two or three cases, then the frequency concept of
probability tells us little or nothing.
Bayes’ theorem seemed like a very attractive approach to
the general problem. If you had an a priori distribution over
all possible universes, Bayes’ theorem would give an exact
probability distribution for the continuation of any possible
sequence of data. The difficulty was in obtaining the a priori
probability distribution.
There had been some discussion of ‘‘personal probability’’
in which each person developed an a priori probability
distribution that was an appropriate summary of his life
experience. This explained why different people made
different predictions based on, apparently, the same data.
Still, the origin of this personal a priori distribution was
unclearnot good enough to use for real prediction.
My general conclusion was that Bayes’ theorem was
likely to be the key. That a person was born with a reason-
ably good built-in a priori probabilitydistribution.The person
would then make predictions and decisions based on this
distribution. The distribution was then modified by their life
experience. The initial ‘‘built-in’’ distribution was obtained
by organic evolution. There was a strong selection in favor
of organisms that made decisions on the basis of ‘‘good’’ a
priori probability distributions. The organisms making
poor decisions would tend to have fewer descendants.
This is a Chomsky-like way of explaining where our
personal probabilities come from. Still, it does not tell what
that distribution is, and it does not tell enough about it to
be useful in making probability estimates.
The biological origin of the a priori distribution suggests
that one might learn much about it by studying living
creaturesthat this might be a very good organizing
principal for the science of psychology.
The correspondences between probability evaluation and
human learning are very close:
(1) Both involve prediction of the future based on data
of the past.
(2) In both of them, prediction alone is of little value.
The prediction must have an associated quantitative
precision before it can be used to make decisionsas in
statistical decision theory.
(3) In both cases the precision of prediction is critically
dependent upon the quality and quantity of data in the past.
(4) In both cases, the precision of the prediction is
critically dependent on the quality and quantity of the com-
putational resources available. Human decisions improve
considerably if people have much time to organize data and
try various theories in attempts to understand it.
That probability has to be defined in terms of the
computational resources necessary to calculate it, is a
relatively recent development.2
2.5. Shannon
Shannon’s papers [Sha 48] and subsequent developments
in information theory have had a profound effect on my
ideas about induction. Most important was the idea that
information was something that could be quantified and
that the quantity of information was closely related to its
probability. It suggested to me what I called at that time
‘‘the information packing problem’’how much data could
one pack into a fixed number of bits, or conversely, how
could one store a certain body of data using the least
number of bits?
The idea was that the amount of data one could pack into
a certain number of bits was related to the redundancy or
information content of the data. Since information content
was related to probability, inverting a solution to the
information packing problem could give one probabilities.
Unfortunately, it was always possible to pack an arbitrary
data string into 1 bit, using a suitable definitiona clearly
inappropriate solution. I was not familiar enough with
universal Turing machines to escape from that dilemma.
Neverthelesswhen I finally did discover algorithmic
probabilitythe fact that it solved the ‘‘information
packing problem’’ was one of the clues that led me to believe
it was correct.
2.6. Carnap
Carnap was one of the last of the philosophers of science
called ‘‘logical positivists.’’ He felt that most of the problems
of philosophy could be solved through the analysis of
language.
Although he was a professor in the philosophy department
at the University of Chicago, most of his students were
physicists or mathematicians. When I first met him, he was
working on a general theory of probabilitymuch as I was.
Some important ideas that I got from him:
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That there were several definitions of the word ‘‘probability’’
the best known was the frequency concept of probability,
which he called P1 . However, there was another kind of
probability: it was the degree of confidence one had in an
hypothesis with respect to a certain body of data. He called
this P2(H, D).
Carnap’s model of probability started with a long sequence
of symbols that was a description of the entire universe.
Through his own formal linguistic analysis, he was able to
assign a priori probabilities to any possible string of symbols
that might represent the universe. He derived his P2(H, D)
from this a priori distribution using Bayes’ theorem.
I liked his function that went directly from data to
probability distribution without explicitly considering
various theories or ‘‘explanations’’ of the data. It was a
Korzybski-like way of avoiding the difficulties inherent in
the verification of probabilistic theories. I also liked his idea
of P2(H, D) and the idea of representing the universe by a
digital string, but his method of computing the a priori
probability distribution seemed unreasonable to me. The
distribution depended very much on just what language was
used to describe the universe. Furthermore, as one made the
describing language larger and more complete, predictions
were less and less contingent on the data. Carnap admitted
these difficulties, but he felt that his theory nonetheless had
redeeming qualities and that we would eventually find a way
out of these difficulties.
Algorithmic probability is close to Carnap’s model, and it
does overcome the difficulties described.
3. THE DISCOVERY OF ALGORITHMIC PROBABILITY
3.1. Huffman
Huffman coding [Huf 52] was an approximate solution
to a special case of the ‘‘information packing problem.’’ It
was usually used if one had a finite number of symbol types
of known frequencies. It was a good code if the data being
coded was well approximated by a Bernoulli sequence,
but it was inappropriate if the data had a more complex
structure.
Nevertheless, when I did discover algorithmic probability,
I realized that it was the inverse of Huffman’s problem. He
obtained a short code from knowledge of probabilities.
I obtained probabilities from knowledge of short codes.
In the years before I had actually proved the correctness
of algorithmic probability, its relation to Huffman’s work
was strong evidence that I was on the right track.
3.2. Minsky and McCarthy
I first met Marvin Minsky and John McCarthy around
1952, soon after leaving the University. At that time, Minsky
was mainly interested in human learning and problem
solving. He wanted to design machines to simulate this aspect
of human behavior and was beginning to get McCarthy
interested. My own goals were more grandiose. I was inter-
ested in prediction and problem solving in general and
persuaded Minsky that our machines would eventually go
well beyond human capabilities.
Through our similarity of interest, Minsky and I soon
became close friends. Although I lived in New York, I would
often visit Boston, where Minsky lived. Although we were
working on essentially the same problems, our backgrounds
were different and we had much to teach each other.
From both Minsky and McCarthy, I learned to under-
stand and appreciate Turing machinesboth universal
and nonuniversal. Up until that time, I had only a poor
understanding of formal logic and the limits imposed by
Go del’s theorems. The translation of formal logic and recur-
sive function theory into theorems about Turing machines
was a real revelation for me. It gave me a quick intuitive
grasp of many ideas that I had before found incomprehensible.
It is not unusual for the translation of a problem into a new
language to have this wonderful effect.
In 1956, McCarthy and Shannon organized the ‘‘Summer
Study Group in Artificial Intelligence’’ at Dartmoutha
gathering of most of the world’s researchers in A. I. and
related fields. At that time, most of us had had a fair amount
of experience with neural nets. Some notable exceptions
were McCarthy, Newell, and Simon. Shannon had done
pioneering work on Boolean networkswhich were close
to neural nets.
One day McCarthy gave a talk on ‘‘well-defined mathe-
matical problems.’’ His thesis was that all mathematical
problems could be formulated as problems of inverting
Turing machines. Specifically, given a machine M whose
inputs were strings of symbols and given a desired output
string, s, we are required to find a string p such that
m( p)=s. McCarthy gave many examples to show how
problems could be put into this form.
I asked him about the induction problem: ‘‘Suppose you
are given a long sequence of symbols describing events in
the real world. How can you extrapolate that sequence?’’
The next day he said, ‘‘Suppose we were wandering about
in an old house, and we suddenly opened a door to a room
and in that room was a computer that was printing out your
sequence. Eventually it came to the end of the sequence and
was about to print the next symbol. Wouldn’t you bet that
it would be correct?’’
There were several difficulties in implementing this idea as
a prediction scheme:
First: What machine should be used?
Second: There may be a large number of inputs to the
machine that give the same initial output but extrapolate
differently. Which should we use?
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Third: Suppose the machine emits no symbols after the
sequence to be extrapolated?
Although these difficulties all seemed quite serious, I
remembered the idea because it seemed intuitively reasonable.
3.3. An Inductive Inference Machine
After the Dartmouth conference, I incorporated much of
my thinking on prediction into the report and paper ‘‘An
Inductive Inference Machine’’ [Sol 56; Sol 57].
How the system operates: It is initially shown a training
set of a number of two-dimensional patterns that represent
correctly worked arithmetic problems, e.g.,
=
0 1 1
0 1 1
, =
1 0 ?
1 0 1
.
Then it is given a problem set of two-dimensional patterns
in which one or more of the positions has a question mark
in it, e.g.,
=
1 0 0
1 ? 0
, =
0 0 ?
0 0 1
.
The problem is to find what symbol the question mark
represents.
To solve the problem, the system has a small number of
primitive abstractions and transformations for combining
and modifying abstractions. These primitive and transfor-
med abstractions are used to create small two-dimensional
patterns that can be used for prediction.
Initially, it tries all of the primitive abstractions on the
training set to see if any lead to correct predictions. If any
do, and they are applicable to problems in the problem set,
they are used for prediction.
If no suitable predictive abstractions are found in the
primitive set, then members of the primitive set are transfor-
med and combined by the set of transformations to produce
new abstractions. These are tested on the training set and
the successful ones are used for prediction on the problem
set.
We continue generating more and more abstractions
until we find at least one that works on the training set and
is applicable to the problem set.
After each round of training, various of the abstractions
are given utility scores, depending on how successful they
were in the prediction process.
In the next round of examples and problems, abstractions
with high utilities are used preferentially in creating new
trial abstractions. We continue with a sequence of problems
of increasing difficulty. There are four important aspects of
the system:
(1) The nature of the problem sequence.
(2) The set of primitive abstractions and transforma-
tions.
(3) How the utility function is evaluated and how it
governs the generation of new abstractions.
(4) The technique used for searching for new abstractions
that are both consistent with the training examples and
applicable to the problem examples.
I spent much time looking for an effective utility function
without finding a really good solution. Many years later,
algorithmic probability proved to be the ideal tool for the
design of utility functions [Sol 86, Sol 89] and Levin’s
search algorithm [Lev 73a; Sol 84] turned out to be the best
way to search for good new abstractions.
3.4. The Discovery of Algorithmic Probability
On reading Chomsky’s ‘‘Three Models for the Description
of Language’’ [Cho 56], I found his rules for generating
sentences to be very similar to the techniques I had been
using in the 1957 paper to create new abstractions from old,
but his grammars were organized better, easier to under-
stand, and easier to generalize. It was immediately clear that
his formal languages were ideal for induction. Furthermore,
they would give a kind of induction that was considerably
different from techniques used in statistics up to that time.
The kinds of regularities it could recognize would be entirely
new.
At the time of Chomsky’s paper, I was trying to find a
satisfactory utility evaluation function for my own system.
I continued working on this with no great success until 1958,
when I decided to look at Chomsky’s paper more closely. It
was easy for me to understand and build upon. In a short
time, I devised a fast left to right parser for context-free
languages and an extremely fast matrix parser for context-
sensitive languages. It took advantage of special 32-bit
parallel processing instructions that most computers have.
My main interest, however, was learning. I was trying to
find an algorithm for the discovery of the ‘‘best’’ grammar
for a given set of acceptable sentences. One of the things
I sought was: Given a set of positive cases of acceptable
sentences and several grammars, any of which is able to
generate all of the sentences, what goodness of fit criterion
should be used? It is clear that the ‘‘ad-hoc grammar,’’ that
lists all of the sentences in the corpus, fits perfectly. The
‘‘promiscuous grammar’’ that accepts any conceivable
sentence, also fits perfectly. The first grammar has a long
description; the second has a short description. It seemed
that some grammar half-way between these, was ‘‘correct’’
but what criterion should be used?
There are other modes of learning in which the ‘‘goodness
of fit’’ criterion is clearer. One such learning environment
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involves a ‘‘teacher,’’ who is able to tell the ‘‘learner’’ if a
proposed sentence is within the language or not. Another
training environment gives negative as well as positive exam
ples of sentences. Neither of these training environments are
easy to obtain in the real world. The ‘‘positive cases only,
with a few errors’’ environment is, by far, most widely
available.
The real breakthrough came with my invention of proba-
bilistic languages and their associated grammars. In a deter-
ministic (nonprobabilistic) language, a string is either an
acceptable sentence or it is not an acceptable sentence.
Taking a clue from Korzybskiwe note that in the real
world, we usually do not know for sure whether anything
is true or falsebut we can assign probabilities. Thus a
probabilistic language assigns a probability value to every
possible string. In a ‘‘normalized’’ language, the total
probability of all strings is one.
It is easy to give examples of probabilistic grammars: any
context-free or context-sensitive generative grammar can be
written as a set of rewrite rules with two or more choices
for each rewrite. If we assign probabilities to each of the
choices, we have a probabilistic grammar.
The way probabilistic grammars define a solution to the
‘‘positive examples only’’ induction problem is:
Each possible nonprobabilistic grammar is assigned an a
priori probability, by using a simple probabilistic grammar
to generate nonprobabilistic grammars.
Each nonprobabilistic grammar that could have created
the data set can be changed to a probabilistic grammar by
giving it probabilities for each of its choices. For the
particular data set of interest, we adjust these probabilities
so the probability that the grammar will create that data set
is maximum.
Given the data di , the probability that a particular
grammar Gj created di is the a priori probability of Gj multi-
plied by the probability that di would be generated if we
knew Gj to be the generating grammar (Bayes’ theorem).
We then chose the grammar for which this product is
largest.
The promiscuous grammar has high a priori probability,
but it assigns low probability to the data. The ad-hoc
grammar has very low a priori probability, but it assigns
probability 1 to the data. These are two extreme grammar
types; the best choice is usually somewhere between them.
For more detailed discussion see [Hor 71; Sol 59; Sol 64b,
pp. 240251].
Upon inventing a new kind of object, one wants to
investigate its properties. One way to do this is to generalize
the object. However, before generalizing probabilistic gram-
mars, let us first generalize the more familiar deterministic
grammars.
What is the most general deterministic grammar? A
grammar can take the form of an acceptance rule or the
form of a generation rule.
The most general deterministic acceptance rule: Suppose
M( ) is a universal Turing machine. If we feed it the finite
string x, its output (when and if it ever stops) will be
denoted by M(x). Let a be a finite string that describes
an acceptance grammar. Let s be a finite string that is a
candidate sentence. Then s is an acceptable sentence in the
language described by a if and only if M(as) prints 1 and
stops.3 It is clear that there are languages and candidate
strings such that the question of acceptance is undecidable.
The generalization to probabilistic languages is immediate.
If b is the description of the probabilistic language and s is
a candidate string, then M(bs) prints out a binary string
that represents the probability that s is in the language
described by b.
A useful restriction on M is that its output tape be uni-
directionalonce it has printed an output symbol it cannot
erase it. In this case, even if the machine does not stop, we
can sometimes obtain an approximation to the probability.
The most general deterministic generative grammar works
similarly to the deterministic acceptance grammar. If q is the
description of a generative grammar, and n is any positive
integer, and M(qn) prints out the string s and stops, then s
is the n th sentence of the language.
The generalization to probabilistic generative grammars
is also immediate. If h is the description of the probabilistic
language and r is an infinite random string, then the
probability that M(hr) will print out a string s and stop is
the probability with which s occurs in the language.
Since r is an infinite string, we will need to modify M to
accommodate it. We do this by giving M three tapes: A
unidirectional output tape, a unidirectional input tape, and
an infinite bidirectional work tape. On the input tape, M
first reads h, then it reads as many bits of r as it needs to
generate the output string. The unidirectional output tape
enables us to have at least partial knowledge of the output
if the machine never stops.
How is the probabilistic language described by M(hr)
related to the deterministic language described by M(qn)?
In M(qn), the integer n is used to determine what choices
are to be made in string generation by the grammar
described by q.
In M(hr), the random number, r, is used to make the
probabilistic choices in string generation by the grammar
described by h.
The expression M(hr) is extremely interesting. The
argument hr consists of a random part preceded by a non-
random description of a language. What would happen if
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the argument of M was purely random: M(r)? If L is the
length of string h, in bits, then r has the probability of just
2&L of starting with the string h and generating the
language defined by h. The result is that the probability
distribution implied by M(r) is the same as the weighted
average of all of the distributions, M(hi r).
Here hi is the i th of the set of all descriptions of all
grammars. The weight associated with hi is 2&Li, where Li is
the length of the description, hi , in bits.
It is not unreasonable to assign 2&Li as the a priori
probability of the grammar hi . This would be the value
given if we had a very simple probabilistic grammar
generating the set of grammars, [hi]. If we do this, our
weighted average amounts to the a priori probability
distribution implied by all grammars.
This means that if we consider all possible descriptions of
all possible grammars, then M(r) is an a priori probability
distribution on all finite stringsa truly amazing result,
since there is no mention of grammars in the expression.
(More carefully defined versions of this a priori distribution
were investigated by Levin [Lev 73b; Lev 74], Ga cs
[Ga c 74], and Chaitin [Cha 75]. Li and Vita nyi call it the
universal discrete distribution [Li 93, Section 4.3.4].)
Suppose we define the shortest description of s as the
shortest string, ds , such that M(ds)=s. Then the probability
assigned to s is approximately 2&Ls since this is the
probability that the first Ls bits of r will be ds . Here Ls is the
length of ds in bits.
I then used the 2&Ls idea to devise a priori probability
distributions for sequential extrapolation [Sol 60a]. Using
the distribution, 2&Ls as a first approximation, I obtained
two different models for sequential prediction.4
The first was based on probabilities of finite strings.
The second model (which I will refer to as algorithmic
probability) defined the a priori probability as the probabil-
ity distribution on the output strings induced by a universal
Turing machine with random input. It was similar to the
M(r) distribution for finite strings, but it allowed infinite
output strings.
In the next two years, I refined the second model (which
is very probably our best model for sequential prediction)
and I added three more models. These five models were
published in 1964 [Sol 64a, Sol 64b]. At the time, I felt it
likely that all of the models would give about the same
probability distributions.
I recently reviewed the 1964 paper with the benefit of
30 years of hindsight. Two of the five models described are
certainly correct. While one of the models is, strictly
speaking, meaningless, it has been of great practical and
heuristic value. It is the closest approximation to
algorithmic probability I know of that has actually been
implemented in a prediction scheme [Ris 89]. For a more
detailed discussion of the 1964 paper see the Appendix.
4. AFTER THE DISCOVERY
At first, most of my evidence for the validity of algorithmic
probability was very informal:
It corresponded to (and defined more exactly) the idea of
Occam’s razorthat ‘‘simple’’ hypotheses are more likely to
be correct.
It was similar to Carnap’s model of induction, but it
seemed to overcome its deficiencies.
Both Huffman coding and the ‘‘information packing
problem’’ used probabilities to compress information.
Algorithmic probability inverted this process and obtained
probabilities from compression.
That algorithmic probability was relatively independent
of the choice of which universal machine was used seemed
likely but was not altogether certain. It was clear that
probabilities assigned by different machines would differ by
only a constant factor (independent of the length of data
described), but this constant factor could be quite large.
Changing reference machines corresponds to changing from
one computer language to another. Although Basic and
Fortran are almost identical, translating from one to the
other requires a program of certainly more than 1000 bytes.
This corresponds to a ‘‘constant factor’’ of greater than
10300a truly enormous number.
Fortunately, in just about all applications of probability,
we are not interested in absolute probabilities, but only in
probability ratios. I had some heuristic arguments to the
effect that the probability ratio for alternative possible
continuations of a sequence should be relatively machine
independent if the sequence were very long.
The second half of the 1964 paper was devoted to examples
of how this probability evaluation method could be applied.
That it seemed to give reasonable answers was some of the
strongest evidence that I had for its correctness.
There was one property that I felt the general induction
system should possess: for long sequences the general system
should give at least as good results as any other induction
system. There was a heuristic argument to show this would
be so.
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4 These two models were first described in a talk given at the Conference
on ‘‘Cerebral Systems and Computers ’’ at the California Institute of
Technology Feb 811, 1960then in a Zator Co. Report [Sol60a], and
again in a more widely circulated AFOSR report [Sol60b]. Minsky briefly
described these ideas in 1961 [Min61], then in more detail in 1962,
including a discussion of ‘‘the invariance theorem’’ [Min62]. The 1961
paper was then reprinted in ‘‘Computers and Thought’’ [Fei63], a very
widely read book that first introduced the world to artificial intelligence.
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In 1968 I devised a simpler minimal criterion for correct-
ness of an induction system: Suppose we have an infinite
string of symbols that was generated by a probabilistic
generator that had a finite description. Then for a suf-
ficiently long sequence of data, the method should give
predictions with probability values very close to those given
by the generator. Later that year an event occurred that
enabled me to prove that algorithmic probability satisfied
this criterion.
4.1. Willis
In 1968 I was asked to review ‘‘Computational Complexity
and Probability Constructions,’’ a paper by David Willis. It
was the first substantive response I’d seen to my 1964 paper
giving the four models. I found his paper to be excellent.
Willis avoided the ‘‘halting problem’’ by defining computa-
tionally limited Turing machines that had no halting
problems. From these machines, he was able to define
probabilities in an exact manner. By raising the computa-
tional limits on his machines, he approached the behavior of
universal machines.
In addition to its value as a rigorous treatment of a sub-
ject that I had treated relatively informally, I was able to
use Willis’ results to prove that these induction methods
satisfied my ‘‘correctness’’ criterion. The methods converged
surprisingly rapidly to the correct probability values.
Unfortunately it took me about 6 months to read
Willis’ paper with sufficient care. By that time, the other two
reviewers and the journal editor had rejected it. One of the
reviewers felt that it did not add much to what I had said in
my 1964 paper.
I wrote Willis, telling him what a great paper it was and
urged him to send it to a different journal. It was finally
published in J. Assoc. Comput. Mach. in 1970 [Wil 70].
It was not until 1975 that I first published the theorem on
the convergence of algorithmic probability to the correct
values [Sol 75a; Sol 75b] and not until 1978 that the proof
itself was published [Sol 78].
Meanwhile, Cover [Cov 74; Sol 78, p. 425] had shown
that if one used ‘‘extension probability’’ as the basis of a
gambling scheme, the yield would be about the maximum
obtainable. The proof was applicable to all complexity-
based probability measures.
These two demonstrations suggested very strongly that
complexity-based induction would be a very good basis for
practical prediction.
4.2. Levin
The first paper I read by Levin was one he had written
with Zvonkin in 1970 [Zvo 70] reviewing work in the
Soviet Union on algorithmic probability and complexity
that had been inspired by Kolmogorov, Levin’s thesis
advisor. Since than I had gotten the impression that Levin
was in some sort of political difficulties and I wondered
whether I could engineer some world academic pressure to
get him out of prison (if it gotten to that point!).
In 1978 I was much relieved to receive a phone call from
Levin; he was safe and sound at MIT with lots of amazing
stories to tell about his adventures. He had, indeed, indulged
in ‘‘political incorrectness,’’ and it was only through the
influence of Kolmogorov that he was able to get out of the
country unscathed!
Soon after I met him, he told me that he had a near
optimumsolution to thegeneral inversionproblem [Lev 73a].
Inversion problems are the P and NP problems of
computational complexity theory; i.e., given a machine M,
that maps finite strings onto finite strings and given the finite
string, x, how can we find in minimal time, a string, p, such
that M( p)=x?
Suppose there exists an algorithm, A, that can examine M
and x and then print out p within time T. Levin had a search
procedure that, without knowing A, could do the same
thing that A did, but in no more time than CT2L. Here, L
is the length of the shortest description of A, using a suitable
reference machine, and C is a measure of how much slower
the reference machine is than a machine that implements
A directly. An alternative form of this cost of the search is
CTP. Here P=2&L is approximately the a priori probability
of the algorithm, A.
The parameter TP plays a critical role in searches of
all kinds. In designing sequences of problems to train an
induction machine the TP value of a particular problem at
a particular point in the training of the machine gives
an upper bound on how long it will take the machine to
solve the problem. In analogy with human problem solving,
I christened TP ‘‘conceptual jump size.’’
Before I met Levin, I had been using TP as a rough
estimate of the cost of a search, but I had no proof that it
was achievable.
Sometime later, I showed that Levin’s search procedure
(which I will henceforth denote by ‘‘Lsearch’’) is very close
to optimum if the search is a ‘‘blind search.’’5 A blind search
is one in which the searcher has only the probabilities of
each of the things to try and is unable to learn anything (i.e.,
modify the probabilities) from any trial.
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5 Though Lsearch has been widely described [Lev 73; Sol 84; Sol 86;
Sol 89; Li 93, pp. 410413] there has been little application of it to real
problem solving. Paul and Solomonoff [Pau 94] discuss its application to
several problems and calculate TP (conceptual jump size) for solutions,
but Schmidhuber [Schm 94] was perhaps the first to actually run a
computer program that used Lsearch to solve problems. While it only
solved simple problems in neural net design the technique used is very
general and of much interest. The probabilistic version of Lsearch used in
the program had a serious error in it, but it has been replaced with a more
conventional nonprobabilistic Lsearch that seems to work fine.
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In artificial intelligence research, ‘‘blind search’’ is usually
impractical, since the size of the search space increases expo-
nentially with the problem size. This is called ‘‘the exponential
explosion.’’
Heuristic search deals with this explosion by sharply
reducing the size of the search space. This process of cutting
out parts of the space is implemented through domain-
specific knowledge of the search space, or by more general
methods that work in many domains.
The probabilistic analog of a heuristic is a function that
assigns low probabilities to areas of the search space that
would be cut out by the heuristic. In the machine learning
theory this is called ‘‘bias.’’
While many problems in science and mathematics can be
formulated as inversion problems, there is another large set
of problems that cannot. These are the time (or resource)
limited optimization problems.
Suppose we have a machine, M, whose inputs are finite
strings, and whose outputs are numbers. We are given a
fixed time T. The problem is to find within time T an input
string, s, such that M(s) is as large as possible.
If no time limit is given, the problem can be generalized
so that after a certain minimum time, one should always
have the latest best solution to the problem available. If
asked for a solution at a time T (previously unknown to the
problem solver), the solution presented should be not much
different from the one obtainable if the limit T were known
in advance. (Dean, Thomas and Boddy [Dea 88] have
coined the term ‘‘anytime algorithm’’ for a solution to this
type of optimization problem. Sigart Bulletin of the ACM
Vol. 7, No. 2, April 1996, has references and recent work in
this area.)
An example of an optimization problem of the first kind:
design an automobile in 6 months having certain specifica-
tions and having minimum cost. Many problems in science
and engineering are of this type.
Sometime later, Levin and I independently generalized
Lsearch to include time-limited optimization problems.
In Lsearch I had what seemed to be a powerful approach
to problem solving. The most general kind of induction can
be formulated as the problem of finding short descriptions
of datawhich is a time-limited optimization problem and,
therefore, amenable to Lsearch.
4.3. Incremental Learning
The next step was to embed these problem solving techni-
ques into a system for machine learning. Since Lsearch was
not much good without the probabilistic equivalent of
heuristics, it would be necessary to have the machine modify
the probability distribution over the search space as a result
of its own experience in problem solving.
As originally envisioned, the new system was very similar
to my old ‘‘inductive inference machine’’ of 1956. The machine
starts out, like a human infant, with a set of primitive
concepts.6 We then give it a simple problem, which it solves
using these primitive concepts. In solving the firs problem,
it acquires new concepts that help it solve the more difficult
second problem, and so on. A suitable training sequence of
problems of increasing difficulty brings the machine to a
high level of problem solving skill.
The system overcomes many limitations of other learning
systems. Most of them are limited in the types of concepts
they can discover, even with infinite search time. This can be
because the system has an ‘‘incomplete’’ set of concepts (not
‘‘universal’’ in the sense of the ‘‘universal Turing machine’’)
andor because the search algorithm is inadequate. We give
our machine a complete set of concepts early in this training.
The use of Lsearch then guarantees that any describable
concept will eventually be discovered by the system.
The scope of problems the system can handle are
inversion problems and time-limited optimization problems.
These cover a very large fraction of the problems encoun-
tered in science and engineering.
There are two aspects of the efficiency of any system
for machine learning. First: what is the computational
complexity of its solutions to problems? How much time
and memory are required? Second: what is the informa-
tional efficiency? How much training is needed for the
system to learn? How many problems andor examples are
required?
In the particular training environment I had in mind,
I felt that Lsearch would be extremely efficient in both
waysI had heuristic arguments suggesting that it was
within a factor of 4 of being optimum.
An additional attractive feature of the system was that
improvement of the general operational efficiency of the
system can be formulated as a time-limited optimization
problemso after the system has had enough experience in
problems improving programs, we have it spend half of its
time on self-improvement.
To get some feedback on the effectiveness of these ideas I
need a suitable training sequence of problems of increasing
difficulty. Designing such a sequence proved to be very
difficult. I was eventually able to design three training
sequences in varying degrees of completeness:
The first learned the rules of arithmetic after being shown
examples of correctly worked problems. This was done in
some detail and TP values (conceptual jump size) were
computed for each stage of the learning [Pau 94].
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6 The term ‘‘concept’’ in machine learning theory has a special meaning
the generalization of the set of positive training instances that we want
the machine to learn. Here, it is being used in a more colloquial manner
I mean it to be any kind of intellectual abstraction. In the present context,
any ‘‘concept’’ can be represented by string of computer instructionsa
‘‘macro.’’ They are combined by concatenation.
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The second induced the laws of algebra after being given
a sequence of simple linear equations to solve.
The third learned to solve general linear equations, then
general quadratics, and then general cubic equations.
Although the system seemed to work (on paper, at least)
for these training sequences, I felt that as a whole, they did
not do what I wanted them to do. I did not see how I could
fit them together to solve more difficult problems and,
ultimately, to solve problems they were not designed to
solve. Another thing that disturbed me was that the system
never used parts of the solutions to previous problems to
help solve new problems. It only used the completed solu-
tions of previous problems. This deficiency was not in the
system itself, but only in the inadequacy of the training
sequences.
One promising approach generalizes the idea of training
sequences. Most training in the real world does not consist
of problems alone. Wholly or partially solved problems,
statements of fact, and hints of various kinds are only a few
of the components of common training environments. It
would seem to be much easier to implement learning with this
larger universe of techniques. I have examined some training
environments of other systems for machine learning.
Genetic algorithms have been a rich source of ideas on
possible training environments. These algorithms use either
a complete set of concepts or can be easily modified to do so.
They work by combining concepts that have been useful in
the past to generate promising new trial solutions, much as
my own system does.
Consider a genetic algorithm system designed to find
values of s that maximize the function M(s). As before,
M is a machine with strings, s as input, and real numbers
between 0 and 10 as output. We start out with [si]0 , i=1,
2, ..., 100, a population of 100 random strings, the zeroth
generation. The mean value of M(si) over that population
is, say, 2. We make the following training sequence, for the
sets, [si] j . The first problem is to get the average value of
M(si) to be 3. The second problem is to get an average of 4.
The j th problem is to get an average of j+1 etc., up to j=7
or j=8. Each problem builds on the information obtained
in the solution to the previous problem.
It is easy to train infant systems in this way, using a
sequence of inversion problems derived from an optimiza-
tion problembut mature systems with more experience do
not solve optimization problems this way. They use Lsearch
for a special direct solution technique that is close to
optimum [Sol 84].
The training sequences that I designed for my own system
were constructed very carefully. At each step in the training
sequence, I knew an upper bound on how long the Lsearch
would take, because I knew at least one solution and at least
one code for that solution. In using training sequences such
as the one described for genetic algorithms, one usually has
no a priori idea as to how long it will take to solve the
problem, and often one does not know if it is at all solvable
by the system.
Nevertheless, I did try a training sequence for a problem
solved by one of Koza’s genetic program [Koz 90, pp. 1624].
It was the problem of learning an 11-input Boolean multi-
plexer function. The general k address bit multiplexer has
k+2k inputs and 1 output. k of the inputs designate an
address of one of the 2k other inputs. The output is the same
as the input at the designated address.
The problem is to construct a Boolean function that
simulates the multiplexer for all 211 of its input configurations.
Using genetic programming, Koza started with the
Boolean functions AND, OR, NOT, and IF7 and obtained
a solution in nine generations using more than 70 million
trials. Using Lsearch, and only the IF function, I obtained
a solution in three generations using about 10 million trials.
In general, a very simple Lsearch obtains a solution for the k
address bit multiplexer in just k generations. It is unclear,
however, as to how much longer it would take to do an
Lsearch over the space containing all four Boolean functions.
While Koza’s solutions had many extraneous functions in
them, the Lsearch solutions were all of minimal complexity.
This makes it much easier to understand the solutions. It
also makes it possible to search for common subtrees in
the trees that represent more successful functions. These
subtrees could then be used in constructing new trial
functions. I have not yet tried this refinement, however.
It should be noted that these results, while suggestive, are
only theoretical pen and paper calculations and not directly
comparable with Koza’s computer simulations.
Artificial life and organic evolution are also sources of
useful training environments. Here we have competition
between species. As each species improves, it presents a
somewhat larger challenge to is competitor. As the compet-
ing species evolve together, they present training sequences
for each other.
Hillis [Hil 90] has used a simulation of this kind of
competition to evolve a solution to a fairly difficult problem
in computer design.
My present research continues to be the exploration of
training environments for incremental learning systems.
I am also trying to get a better understanding of how
probabilistic heuristics are discovered and applied to Lsearch.
5. RELATION OF THIS WORK TO THAT OF OTHERS
5.1. Theoretical Analysis
The five years following the 1964 publications was a time
of much activity in this field, but, except for the work of
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7 IF is a 3 input, 1 output Boolean function corresponding to a
multiplexer with k=1.
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Willis and Levin, little of its seems to have been inspired by
my own work.
Kolmogorov [Kol 65; Kol 68a; Kol 68b; Kol 69] was
interested in randomness and complexity of one string with
respect to another, as well as the development of informa-
tion theory and probability based on lengths of codes.
Strangely enough, he did not appear to be interested in
inductive inference.8
He defined the algorithmic complexity of a string to be
the length of the shortest code needed to describe it. A
random string was one whose complexity was about as
large as its length. These definitions motivated a group of
brilliant associates to explore their properties.
Martin-Lo f [Mar 66] developed a definition of ran-
domness somewhat different from Kolmogorov’s, using
‘‘randomness tests.’’
Kolmogorov had read my 1964 paper by the time that
Levin joined his group. From Kolmogorov’s description of
this paper, Levin put my a priori probability into a more
exact form. His work in this area was similar to that of Willis,
but while Willis avoided the incomputability problems of
universal machines by using finite approximations to them,
Levin faced these incomputability problems directly. He
defined ‘‘semi-computability’’ a kind of weakened computa-
bility that enabled him to analyze the behavior of many
otherwise intractable functions. While Willis’ work seemed
closer to practical realization, Levin’s was a model of
mathematical elegance.
Apparently independently of my own work and that
of Kolmogorov, Chaitin published two papers [Cha 66;
Cha 69] defining randomness in terms of program length.
In the first of these papers he informally suggested that the
shortness of a program that describes a sequence might be
an index as to how good a theory that program represents.
He did not, however, investigate this idea at any length.
In the period from 1970 to 1975, Levin [Lev 73b; Lev 74],
Ga cs [Ga c 74], and Chaitin [Cha 75] defined universal a
priori probability distributions on finite strings. These were
closely related to the probability distribution on all finite
strings induced by M(r) (Section 3.4) in my original
generalization of probabilistic languages.
Cover [Cov 74; Sol 78, p. 428] used Chaitin’s distribu-
tion on finite strings to define ‘‘extension complexity.’’ This
in turn was used to define a probability measure, which
was similar to the fourth model I had described in 1964
[Sol 64a].9
For a history of discoveries in this field, as well as detailed
treatment of the discoveries themselves, the book of Li and
Vita nyi [Li 93] is unexcelled.
5.2. Practical Induction
5.2.1. Optimal Approximations
The convergence theorem [Sol 78, Theorem 3] makes
algorithmic probability look very attractive as a means
of induction. It is the only induction system we know of
that is ‘‘complete.’’ By this we mean that if there is any
describable regularity in a body of data, algorithmic
probability is guaranteed to discover it using a relatively
small sample of the data. It is the only probability evaluation
method known to be complete. As a necessary consequence
of its completeness, this kind of probability must be incom-
putable. Conversely, any computable probability measure
cannot be complete.
We are using the term ‘‘incomputable’’ in a special way.
Algorithmic probability is as ‘‘computable’’ as the value
of ?but with one important difference; when we make
successive approximations to the value of ?, we know how
large the error in each approximation can be. In the case of
algorithmic probability, we have a procedure for successive
approximations that is guaranteed to converge to the
right value. However, at no point in the calculation can
we make a useful estimate of the error in the current
approximation.
This might be regarded as a serious criticism of the use of
algorithmic probability or approximations to it, to solve
practical problems, but it is not. It is a difficulty shared by
all probability evaluation methods. If they are complete,
then they are incomputable. If they are computable (either
as independent probability measures or as approximations
to algorithmic probability) then they must be incomplete.
This incompleteness implies that there have to be regular-
ities that are invisible to them. When used with data having
regularities of these kinds, computable methods will have
errors of unknown size. It is likely that all quantitative
methods of dealing with uncertainty have this uncertainty of
error size.
It has only been through the analysis of algorithmic prob-
ability that these very general limitations of knowledge of
error size have become known. I will show, however, that
despite its incomputability, algorithmic probability can serve
as a kind of ‘‘gold standard’’ for induction systems
that while it is never possible to tell how close a particular
computable measure is to this standard, it is often possible
to know how much closer one computable measure is to the
standard than another computable measure is. I believe that
this ‘‘partial ordering’’ may be as close as we can ever get to
a standard for practical induction. I will outline a general
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8 Levin [Lev 95] attributes this to induction being an ill-defined
mathematical problem. I do not, however, find this convincing.
9 Recognizing that models are similar is often nontrivial. I read Cover’s
1974 paper very carefully and wrote an extensive analysis of it in 1978
[Sol 78]; but it was only recently, on rereading my 1964 paper, that I
realized that one of its models was close to Cover’s ‘‘extension complexity.’’
See the Appendix for further discussion.
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procedure that tells us how to sped our time most efficiently
in finding computable measures that are as close as possible
to this standard. This is the very best that we can ever hope
to do.
To better understand the foregoing, let us consider the
following definition of algorithmic probability:
P(x)=: 2&li (1)
P(x) is the algorithmic probability of finite string x. li is the
length of the i th description of string x.
The sum is over all such descriptions. (See [Sol 78,
p. 423] for more details.)
That the sum is incomputable, is associated with the fact
that it is often impossible to verify in finite time whether a
particular string is a description of x or not.
Over the years there has been a general impression
in the scientific community that this incomputability would
make it impossible to use algorithmic probability as a
tool for statistical prediction (see, for example, [Ris 95,
p. 197]).
From the beginning, however, this difficulty was recognized
and methods for dealing with it were proposed [Sol 64a,
Section 3.1.2.1]. Willis [Wil 70] formalized one of these
methods in what we will call ‘‘resource bounded algorithmic
probability.’’
The most efficient way to implement resource bounded
algorithmic probability is to approximate Eq. (1) by the
largest lower bound on P(x) that can be demonstrated in
time, T. This is usually done by finding many short codes for
x that give terms summing to that bound. This kind of
approximation to algorithmic probability is an example
of a ‘‘time limited optimization problem’’ and is directly
solvable by Lsearch.10
By getting as large a value of the sum as we can,
we get as close as possible to algorithmic probability in
the allotted time. This seems like the best possible way to
spend our time computing probabilities, since algorithmic
probability is at present the best theoretical induction
system we have.
Resource bounded algorithmic probability is then an
ideal way to define ‘‘practical probability.’’ It captures a vital
feature of any possible practical application of probability:
While the value of algorithmic probability is clearly defined
in a mathematical sense, it is incomputable in any practical
sense. Any value we obtain as an approximation will depend
critically on just what computational resources we used to
get it. This leads to a definition of practical probability that
is a function of three arguments:
1. The data.
2. The a priori informationwhich is uniquely charac-
terized by our choice of universal reference machine.
3. The resources available for computationtime and
memory.
Any failure to specify each of these arguments exactly can
lead to gross ambiguities in the value of the probability.
5.2.2. Suboptimal Approximations
There have been several suboptimal approximations to
algorithmic probability. One of the earliest is that of Van
Heerden [Van 63].11 He considered the prediction of
binary sequences by Boolean functions. His criterion for the
best function to use: Add the length of the description of
each function to the number of errors it made in prediction.
Least is best.
We may regard this technique as approximating the sum
in Eq. (1) by the single largest term we can find.
Before I read his report, I had considered this kind of
minimum description length as an approximation to the
universal a priori distribution [Sol 60a, Eq. (1)]. The
particular form that I used was very general but it always
assigned probabilities that were integral powers of two.
While this method clearly did not give correct probabilities,
I was at that time uncertain as to how large the error was.
In my research notes I subsequently called this prediction
technique ‘‘the VH method.’’
There are theoretical reasons for believing that the error
may be small if the shortest code one has found thus far
were indeed the shortest code for the data. However, for
induction problems in which one is uncertain as to the class
of stochastic functions that generated the data (as in
psychology, economics, geology), one cannot know one has
the shortest code and the amount of accuracy lost must
remain unknown.
Wallace and Boulton [Wal 68] used what they called
MML (minimum message length) to obtain a continuum of
probability values. They considered various functional
forms to assign probabilities to a sequence of data symbols.
The function selected was the one for which the length of
description of the function, minus the logarithm of the prob-
ability assigned to the data by the function, was minimal.
This technique is the same as including in Eq. (1) certain
terms in addition to that corresponding to the shortest code
found. Since the sum is larger than Van Heerden’s, it is a
uniformly better approximation to algorithmic probability.
Rissanen started out [Ris 78] with a technique similar to
MML which be called minimum description length (MDL),
but he slowly modified it over the years. The latest version,
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10 Although the technique has been described in detail [Sol 84], I know
of no attempt to solve a real time limited optimization problem using
Lsearch.
11 Peter Van Heerden is best known for his discovery of a method to
store information optically in a three-dimensional crystal.
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called ‘‘stochastic complexity’’ [Ris 89], is not far from the
negative logarithm of algorithmic probability.
Rissanen avoids the incomputability problem by not using
all possible functions. He considers limited classes of predic-
tive primitive recursive functions; then he takes a weighted
sum of their predictions. The weights are assigned to the
functions using classical ideas on a priori probability
distributions, modified by considerations of code length.
Since he sums over more terms of Eq. (1) than Wallace and
Boulton do, he gets a better approximation to algorithmic
probability.
We can, however, get even closer to algorithmic probabil-
ity than stochastic probability does. Rissanen’s ‘‘primitive
recursive functions’’ are the functions that are commonly
used in the sciences. They are well behaved and the values
of their arguments for which the functions are defined are
known or computable.
A larger, less well behaved class of functions is the set of
partial recursive functions. They are defined for certain
values of their arguments, but not for others. However, if a
function is not defined for a certain argument, it is often
impossible to be certain of this fact. These arguments
correspond to certain intractable descriptions of x in Eq. (1).
We can deal very nicely with functions of this kind, using
resource limited algorithmic probability. The Lsearch
algorithm tells just how much time to spend trying to verify
a potential code that does not seem to be defined.
How often do partial recursive functions occur in proba-
bilistic calculations involving real world events? It appears
that there are many areas of science in which functional
forms are either partial recursive or practically partial
recursive; i.e., the time needed to compute the functions for
certain of their arguments is greater than we have available,
and we cannot tell in advance for which values of the
arguments this is true. Long branching causal chains giving
rise to functions of this sort commonly occur in geology,
biology, sociology, and economics.
In predicting earthquakes or the motion of financial
markets, we cannot afford the limitations of suboptimal
approximations. We need the full power of resource limited
algorithmic probability.
A. APPENDIX
A.1. Description of the Five Models
The first 1964 paper [Sol 64a] described five models for
induction. Four of these models were based on two kinds of
universal Turing machines. The first kind of machine, M1 ,
was a very general universal Turing machine, with no
constraints on its input or output. The second kind of
machine, M2 , was a special 3-tape machine. It had unidirec-
tional input and output tapes, as well as a bidirectional
work tape. The unidirectional output meant that once an
output symbol was written, it could not be erased.
In M1 , once a symbol was written as output, the machine
could erase it and write another symbol if the program told
it to do so. M2 also had what I called in my research notes
‘‘the sequential property.’’ If M2(x)=a (x and a being finite
strings), then M2(xy)=ab [Sol 64a, p. 16]. This means
that if we concatenate anything onto the end of the code
for a, then the machine’s output string must start with the
string a.12
The first model for induction was based on M1 . An a
priori probability was assigned to a sequence on the basis of
a weighted sum of all possible programs for that sequence
with all possible finite continuations of it. The weight
assigned to a program of length N was 2&N.
The second model (which I now call algorithmic proba-
bility) was based on M2 . Random bits were fed into the
machine as input. The probability assigned to a particular
string, s, was then the probability that the machine would
have as output a string that had s as prefixi.e., its output
would be s, possibly followed by a finite or infinite number
of symbols.
The third model used Machine M1 . To obtain the a priori
probability of the string, s, we first select a large number, N.
Then C(s, N) is the number of input strings of length N that
cause the machine to print an output that has s as prefix,
before it stops. C(N) is the number of inputs of length N that
cause the machine to eventually stop, regardless of what its
output is. Then the a priori probability assigned to string s
is the limit, as N approaches infinity, of C(s, N)C(N).
The fourth model was the same as the third, except that
M2 was used instead of M1 .
The fifth model makes probability evaluations by using a
weighted mean of the evaluations given by all possible
probability evaluation methods. The weight given to any
particular evaluation method is the product of two factors.
The first factor is the probability assigned to the known data
by that probability evaluation method. The second factor is
the a priori probability of that method. If the smallest
number of bits needed for a program to generate a particular
evaluation method is N, then this factor is approximately
2&N for that method.
A.2. Evaluation of the Five Models
The second model is certainly correct. The description of
the machine M2 , with unidirectional input and output is
correct in all details. The final expression [Sol 64a, Eq. (7)]
gives the conditional probability that the sequence T will be
followed by sequence a.
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12 A partial recursive function having the ‘‘sequential property’’ was later
called a ‘‘process’’ by Levin [Zvo 70, Definition 3.1] and by Schnorr
[Sch 73, p. 378]. Li and Vita nyi [Li 93, p. 238, Definition 4.13] called it a
‘‘monotonic machine.’’
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The conditional probability given in this equation is that
of a semi-measure rather than a normalized measure [Li 93,
p. 215]. In general, it is smaller than a normalized conditional
probability. However, Ga cs has shown [Li 93, Theorem 5.1,
p. 285] that the error in this kind of conditional probability
converges rapidly to zerojust as it does for a normalized
conditional probability measure [Sol 76, Theorem 3, p. 426].
The fourth model, also based on M2 , is also correct. It
certainly converges, and because it only considers finite
continuations of the known sequence, it is similar to Cover’s
‘‘extension probability’’ [Cov 74]. While it is better than
extension probability in both betting yield and size of
error in probability estimate, I do not know whether it is
significantly better.
The first and third models are based on M1 , the unrestric-
ted universal Turing machine. The 1964 paper does not
B. APPENDIX
Timeline of Papers Referenced
1948 Shannon
1949
1950 Carnap
1951
1952 Huffman
1953
1954
1955
1956 Chomsky
1957
1958
1959
1960 Solomonoff
1961 Minsky
1962 Minsky
1963 Minsky Van Heerden 63
1964 Solomonoff
1965 Kolmogorov 65
1966 Chaitin Martin-Lo f 66
1967
1968 Willis Kolmogorov Wallace, Boulton 68
1969 Chaitin Kolmogorov 69
1970 Willis Zvonkin, Levin 70
1971
1972
1973
1974 Cover
1975 Solomonoff Chaitin 75
1976
1977
1978 Solomonoff Rissanen 78
Note. The times are all publication dates, except for Willis, 1968, which gives the year that I first read the paper
published in 1970.
describe the machine very exactly. As a result, while it is
possible to define its operation so that the expressions
for probability given by both models converge, it is
also possible to define the operations in ways such that
I have been unable to tell whether the expressions will
converge or not. This puts models one and three in a kind
of limbo.
The fifth model considers ‘‘all possible probability
methods.’’ Unfortunately, it is not possible to effectively
enumerate all such methods, so the recipe, if taken literally,
is meaningless. On the other hand, in practical prediction it
is often quite possible to take a weighted sum of a large
number of methods that are effectively enumerable. At the
present time, the best approximations to algorithmic
probability that have been programmed, have taken this
form [Ris 89].
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